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Reexamining the Pay Differentials-Organizational 
Outcomes Relationship in Korea: 











This research examines the effects of pay differentials on financial 
performance and employee turnover in Korea by considering a critical 
employee-based factor: organizational identification. Incorporating 
tournament theory and social identity theory, authors theorize that pay 
differentials increase financial performance and employee turnover without 
considering employees’ organizational identification. If considered, however, 
whereas the positive effects of pay differentials on financial performance 
will be weaker, the effects on turnover will be stronger. Using a sample of 
Korean cross-industry firms, results show pay differentials have a positive 
influence on only financial performance. Also, as predicted, while the 
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positive relationship between pay differentials and financial performance 
became weaker, the relationship with turnover became stronger when 
employees’ organizational identification is high. Theoretical and practical 
implications for strategic pay structures are discussed.
Keywords: Pay Differentials, Turnover, Organizational Identification, 
Financial Performance, and Korea
inTRODuCTiOn
During the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, Korean 
companies experienced transition from an egalitarian (or compressed) 
pay structure to a more hierarchical pay structure among employees 
(Bae 1997; Rowley and Bae 2002). Some studies found that this 
transition in pay structure improved employees’ performance (Kim 
2010; Ko and Jung 2008). Simultaneously, however, a number of 
employees reported that they experienced huge conflicts between 
traditional value system and newly adopted pay system, which led 
to the drastic decrease of employees’ organizational loyalty (Bae 
and Rowley 2002; Kim 2010, Rowley and Bae 2002). The purpose of 
this study is to clarify the conditions which made differentiated pay 
more or less effective in Korean organizations context, and thereby 
providing implications for organizations in other collectivistic 
societies.
To date, little research on hierarchical pay structure has 
considered the effects of employees’ shared values. More specifically, 
although tournament theory and related findings have explained 
that differentiated pay structures exert positive effects by 
encouraging severe competition for considerable rewards (Lazear 
and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986), those studies have overlooked issues 
of congruence between pay differentials and employee-based factors 
such as employees’ values or expectations about their organizations. 
Congruence here refers to the compatibility between employees’ 
attitude toward pay differentials and their attitude such as values 
or expectations about their organizations.  This congruence issue 
is particularly pronounced when discussing the transferability of 
pay differentials across different social contexts (Kepes, Delery, 
and Gupta 2009). Using the social identification theory, which 
explains people’s sense of self when they identify with a group or an 
organization (Tajfel and Turner 1979), we argue that if a firm designs 
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and operates a highly differentiated pay structure, employees who 
identify highly with their organizations will feel that their relational 
contracts have been severely violated (Abrams, Ando, and Hinkle 
1998; Morrison and Robinson 1997). 
In addition, most researchers have focused on performance at 
individual (Becker and Huselid 1992; Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
1990) or organizational (Brown, Sturman, and Simmering 2003; 
Shaw, Gupta, and Delery 2002) levels. In particular, previous 
research is overly weighted toward examining financial outcomes 
(Bloom 1999; Brown, Sturman, and Simmering 2003; Kepes, Delery, 
and Gupta 2009; Shaw, Gupta, and Delery 2002) because financial 
performance at the firm level directly relates to firm survival. In 
contrast, existing literature with a few exceptions (e.g., Bloom and 
Michel 2002; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1992; Shaw and Gupta 2007) 
has often overlooked turnover as another important organizational 
effectiveness.  However, considering that there are some limitations 
of financial performance as a reflection of employees’ perceptions 
or attitudes (Batt, Colvin, and Keefe 2002; Holtom, Mitchell, and 
Eberly 2008), turnover should be considered another organizational 
outcome that indicates the effectiveness of the differentiated pay 
system from the employee’s perspective. 
Taken together, this paper will expand the compensation 
literature in two ways. First, recognizing that previous research 
has overlooked employee-based factors, we highlight the 
congruence between pay systems and value systems. Considering 
that incongruence between employees’ sense of oneness with 
an organization (organizational identification) and individual 
performance-driven pay systems can trigger severe conflicts, it is 
vital to address organizational identification, an employee-based 
factor, to determine pay differentials’ true effects. This approach 
may somewhat clarify seemingly contradictory results in previous 
studies on differentiated pay structure (Henderson and Fredrickson 
2001). Second, we call attention to employee turnover as a critical 
organizational outcome in the pay structure literature. Turnover can 
reflect employees’ perceptions about current pay systems, which can 
be difficult to capture by measuring a firm’s financial performance 
alone (Batt, Colvin, and Keefe 2002; Holtom, Mitchell, and Eberly 
2008). By considering employee turnover, in parallel with financial 
performance, our study will further expand our understanding 
regarding the effects of pay differentials on organizations.
46 Seoul Journal of Business
The paper is structured as follows. First, we begin by reviewing 
the literature on pay differentials, and theorize the relationship 
between pay differentials and organizational performance—financial 
performance and turnover rates—from the tournament theory 
view. We then extend the tournament theory by incorporating 
the organizational identification theory and suggest that the pay 
differentials effects are strengthened or weakened depending on the 
extent of employees’ organizational identification. After testing the 
hypotheses using a sample of cross-industry companies in Korea, we 
discuss the implications of our empirical findings for practitioners 
and scholars.
LiTeRaTuRe ReVieW anD ReseaRCH HYPOTHeses
Pay Differentials and Organizational Outcomes
Pay differentials refer to a firm’s pay structure in which employee 
compensation is distributed across job positions (vertical differential) 
or within the same jobs (horizontal differential) (Bloom and Michel 
2002; Gerhart and Rynes 2003). In this paper, we focus on intra-
firm pay differentials (vertical differential) that effectively indicate 
how much the firm emphasizes outcomes and competitiveness 
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003). Greater gaps in pay structures indicate 
that firms highly value each individual’s achievements and rivalries 
(Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986). Tournament theory provides 
appropriate rationales to strongly support and widely disseminate 
the differentiated pay system; it suggests that larger pay differentials 
in an organizational hierarchy encourage employees to work harder 
(Rosen 1986). This rests on uneven pay growth based on relative 
performance evaluations, not the absolute performance level (Lazear 
1995; Lazear and Rosen 1981). According to the ‘survival of the 
fittest’ rule, only a few winning contestants can advance to the 
next round and enjoy considerable rewards and incentives (Rosen 
1986). This motivation effect is more important when it is difficult 
to monitor employees’ intentions and behaviors (Lambert, Larcker, 
and Weigelt 1993; Rosen 1986). As a result, uneven pay growth at 
upward stages encourages employees to work harder voluntarily 
(Rosen 1986). 
Previous research founded on these perspectives has asserted 
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that steeper pay differentials raise each employee’s productivity, 
and this overall increase in individual performance also enhances 
firm performance (Jenkins et al. 1998; Lazear 1995, 1999; Lazear 
and Rosen 1981; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Stajkovic and 
Luthans 2001). In other words, steeper pay structures maximize 
each individual’s performance; thus organizational performance 
reaches its highest level because the whole is equal to the sum of 
its parts. This directly indicates a firm’s purpose of signaling to 
increase employee productivity and financial performance (Balkin 
and Gomez-Mejia 1987; Gerhart and Rynes 2003). Consistent with 
tournament theory and related literature, we expect that larger 
pay differentials should enhance firm performance as well as each 
individual’s productivity.
H1: Pay differentials will be positively related to the financial 
performance of firms.
In addition to firm performance, tournament theory also applies 
to employee turnover. As noted earlier, tournament theory suggests 
differentiated treatment and rewards through rank-order contests 
(Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986). Tournament rewards increase 
precipitously at higher stages of the organizational hierarchy, so 
winners can enjoy huge rewards (Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt 
1993; Rosen 1986). In stark contrast, losers are disqualified from 
the next round, and are expected to quit. Thus, employees with 
relatively high expectations of winning have more incentive to 
remain with the organization, but employees who feel disadvantaged 
under this differentiated pay system are more likely to leave (Bloom 
and Michel 2002; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1992; Shaw et al. 2009; 
Shaw and Gupta 2007).
Previous research using tournament theory has shown that 
larger pay differentials trigger quitting. For example, Lazear (1999) 
demonstrated that the adoption of a piece-rate plan lowered the 
turnover rates of high performers, but increased the quitting rates 
of average employees. Consistent with Lazear’s findings, Shaw 
and Gupta (2007) showed that pay differential differently affects 
employee turnover; good performers’ turnover patterns markedly 
differ from those of average and low performers. In addition, 
Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1992) also found that the patterns of 
turnover rates vary somewhat according to their own places in 
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salary distribution. In other words, whereas good performers at the 
top of the pay structure show low turnover rates, average or bad 
performers placed in the middle or bottom of the structure show 
high resignation rates. Based on tournament theory and earlier 
empirical results, the overall turnover rate will increase as pay 
differentials become larger, because only a few winners tend to stay 
and most losers are likely to leave. 
H2: Pay differentials will be positively related to employee 
turnover rate.
The Role of Organizational Identification
As noted earlier, tournament theory predicts increased firm 
performance and employee turnover. However, these predictions can 
be challenged, because tournament theory overlooks employee-based 
factors that critically determine pay differential effects. To create 
the expected effects, the pay system must be not only congruent 
with other human resource practices, but must also be compatible 
with employees’ value systems (Burton, Lauridsen, and Obel 2002, 
2004). Among various shared values or perceptions, the extent 
of employees’ sense of oneness with their employing organization 
can play a critical role in the success or failure of differentiated 
pay structure with emphasis on individual performance and 
competitiveness (Abrams, Ando, and Hinkle 1998; Hekman, Bigley, 
and Steensma 2009). 
Organization identification refers to the sense of ‘oneness’ with 
an organization (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Mael and Ashforth 1992). 
The concept has theoretical foundations in social identity theory, 
which explains why people wish to belong to certain social groups 
for psychological attachments, how they identify themselves based 
on group or organizational characteristics, and what parameters 
reinforce such self-identities as time progresses (Hogg 1992; Hogg 
and Terry 2000; Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1985). According to this 
theory, people tend to establish their self-concept by identifying with 
their groups or organizations, and the extent of this identification 
greatly influences their perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors 
(Abrams, Ando, and Hinkle 1998; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Mael 
and Ashforth 1992, 1995). In other words, the more employees feel 
at one with their organization (the stronger their organizational 
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identification), the more they perceive organizational difficulties as 
being their own problems, and the more they cooperate with others 
to achieve organizational goals.
Organizational identification can be understood as the working 
of the relational self—the self in relation to significant others or 
groups (Andersen and Chen 2002; Cross, Bacon, and Morris 2000). 
The main difference between organizational identification and 
relational self is found in that organizational identification includes 
individuals’ identification with organizations while relational self is 
more about individuals’ relation with significant others or groups.
These tendencies of identifying with an organization are definitely 
stronger when the relationship between an organization and an 
employee is similar to the common fate of the community (Abrams, 
Ando, and Hinkle 1998). This relational pattern can be easily 
found in East Asian countries, which are heavily influenced by 
Confucianism (Bae and Lawler 2000; Chiang 2005; Rowley, Benson, 
and Warner 2004). In this aspect, when employees strongly identify 
with their organization, they are likely to feel and expect close links; 
they value a psychological contract based on social exchange, an 
organizational value-oriented control mechanism, and cooperation 
among members to improve organizational performance (Kerr and 
Slocum 1987; Lepak and Snell 2002; Ouchi 1979, 1980; Rousseau 
1989, 1995).
However, these characteristics can be incongruent with the intent 
of the pay system that emphasizes larger gaps in organizational 
hierarchies. As mentioned above, larger pay differentials based on 
tournament theory suggest that principals control agents through 
larger gaps in the pay structure because of difficulty in monitoring 
agents’ behavior. Thus, reinforcement of pay differentials signals 
messages such as definite separation between the employee and 
the organization, market-based employment contracts, control 
mechanisms throughout the system, and competitiveness to 
maximize individual performance (Kerr and Slocum 1987; Lazear 
1999; Lazear and Rosen 1981; Lepak and Snell 2002; Ouchi 
1979, 1980). This incongruence can engender unintended effects: 
employees can become confused about what behavior the firm 
rewards and become less motivated (Kerr 1975). As a result, the 
purpose of the pay system becomes discolored (Baron and Kreps 
1999; Bowen and Ostroff 2004; Burton and Obel 2004; Kerr 1975; 
Li, Frenkel, and Sanders 2011). Accordingly, when considering 
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organizational identification, pay differentials may damage a firm’s 
financial performance. 
H3: Organizational identification will negatively moderate 
the relationship between pay differentials and a firm’s financial 
performance, so that the relationship between pay differentials 
and a firm’s financial performance will be weaker when 
organizational identification is high.
As previously discussed, when organizational identification is high, 
employees feel at one with their organization, perceive organizational 
difficulties as being their own problems, and cooperate with others 
to achieve organizational goals (Abrams, Ando, and Hinkle 1998; 
Ashforth and Mael 1989; Mael and Ashforth 1992). However, 
high pay differentials mean that only some select employees will 
get increased pay while the majority will inevitably be left to feel 
disadvantaged. This will reduce the extent of attachment and trust 
that the latter group of employees had for the organizations and 
increase their turnover intentions (Kerr and Slocum 1987; Mael 
and Ashforth 1995; Mossholder, Settoon, and Henagan 2005; 
Shaw and Gupta 2007). Thus, the positive relationship between 
pay differentials and employee turnover rate will be stronger when 
employees’ organizational identification is high. 
H4: The organizational identification of employees will positively 
moderate the relationship between pay differentials and employee 
turnover, so that the relationship between pay differentials 
and employee turnover rates will be stronger when employees’ 
organizational identification is high.
meTHODOLOgY
Data and sample
We obtained the data for this study from the Human Capital 
Corporate Panel (HCCP) 2007 survey, which the Korean Research 
Institute for Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET) collected in 
collaboration with the Korea Ministry of Labor. The sampling frame 
represented all Korean companies with more than 100 employees, 
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foreign company subsidiaries, and public service organizations (see 
Yang and Klaas 2011). From 7,246 Korean companies, KRIVET used 
the stratified sampling method to select and contact approximately 
1,899 companies. We initially obtained a stratified random sample 
of 467 firm cases with $100 million in total assets and 100 or more 
employees. Our sample size was reduced to 400 cases (21.1% of 
the 1,899 firms surveyed, and 86% of the survey respondents) with 
10,461 individuals from 15 different industries as the final sample 
(N = 400, n = 10,461). On average, we found 26.08 individual 
respondents per company, approximately 83% males with a mean 
age of 36.7 years and an average organizational tenure of 8.7 years. 
There are no significant mean differences of testable variables 
between our final samples and deleted ones.
measurement 
Independent variables
Pay differentials. We estimated the hierarchical or vertical pay 
differential for each company by using pay information items in 
the HCCP data: the total annual salary of a first-year staff member, 
a first-year manager, and a first-year general manager. Because 
of this practical difficulty in obtaining salary information for all 
employees, we used Siegel and Hambrick’s (2005) approach to make 
the maximum use of our limited information. To calculate intra-
firm pay differentials, we first computed the average pay difference 
between general managers (Level 1) and managers (Level 2), and 
then divided the value by the average pay level of the manager (Level 
1- Level 2)/ Level 2). We used the same method (Level 2- Level 3)/ 
Level 3) to calculate the pay differential between managers (Level 2) 
and first-year staff. The first pay differential divided by the second 
pay differential became the final pay differential ((Level 1- Level 2)/ 
Level 2) / (Level 2- Level 3)/ Level 3)). If this value was greater than 
1, it meant that the pay differentials grew more hierarchically in 
the case of general managers and managers, rather than in case 
of managers and first-year employees. This approach was also 
suggested by Main and colleagues (1993) and McClelland (2008).  
Organizational identification. Our measure was based on 
measures used by Mael and Ashforth (1992) and Hekman et al. 
(2009). We operationalized organizational identification using four 
items rated from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree in the 
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HCCP data: 1) Too much in my life would be disrupted if I decided 
to leave my company, 2) I really feel as if this company’s problems 
are my own, 3) This company deserves my loyalty, and 4) If I had 
another chance to work elsewhere, I would leave my company 
(reversed coding). The value used for organizational identification 
was the mean of responses for the four items and the Cronbach’s 
alpha among them was .75. 
We also checked the statistical validity of  employees’ 
organizational identification at the firm level because of the level 
issue in the aggregation of members’ shared perceptions. We 
computed rwg, which indicates the adjusted within-group agreement 
for a slight negative skew in the expected variance, and obtained a 
median value of .85, which was above the conventionally acceptable 
rwg value of .70 (James et al. 1984, 1992). 
Also we conducted one-way analysis of variance, and checked 
the between-group variance for all of these variables. Normally, 
aggregation can be justified when the score of ICC (1) is under .30 
(Bliese 2000) and the score of ICC (2) is above .70 (Kozlowski and 
Klein 2000, Glick 1985). In our results, ICC (1) was .15 and ICC (2) 
was .82. Thus, we concluded that aggregation could be justified. The 
final value of organizational identification at the firm level was the 
aggregated mean of the four items and the Cronbach’s alpha was 
.87 which is higher than the score of individuals (Rousseau 1985).
Dependent variables
We considered two dependent variables of organizational outcomes 
that are usually employed in the contemporary literature on 
compensation (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery 2002): the firm’s financial 
performance (Brown, Sturman, and Simmering 2003; Kepes, Delery, 
and Gupta 2009) and the turnover rate (Bloom and Michel 2002; 
Shaw and Gupta 2007).
Firm’s financial performance. We used the return on assets (ROA), 
which the pay differential literature has widely used as a measure 
of financial performance (Brown, Sturman, and Simmering 2003; 
Henderson and Fredrickson 2001; Kepes, Delery, and Gupta 2009). 
The value used for ROA was the net profit divided by the total assets 
of the year 2008 in the annual reports database to reflect the lagged 
effects of pay differentials. The amount of net profit, total assets, 
and equities were measured in 1,000 Korean Won, which equals 
approximately $1.
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Employee turnover rate. We operationalized turnover rate as the 
number of individuals who left a firm divided by the total number of 
employees in the firm (Shaw et al. 2005). We included only full-time 
employees in remaining and leaving counts.
Control variables
We controlled several variables that might account for the 
relationships between our independent and dependent variables. 
First, we controlled for the effect of organizational age (LNAGE) 
and size (LNSIZE) because organizational age and size have been 
acknowledged as critical firm-specific factors that affect various 
organizational outcomes (Bloom and Michel 2002). LNAGE was 
operationalized as the logged value of 2007 minus the founding 
year and LNSIZE was measured as the logarithm of assets (Bloom 
and Michel 2002). Next, we controlled for the effects of union 
and foreign institutions because the existence and power of the 
union are associated with pay-related decisions and workforce 
performance (Kaufman 2002) and foreign companies tend to adopt 
and implement performance-driven pay systems (Ding, Fields, and 
Akhtar 1997; Lu and Bjorkman 1997). Union was coded 1 if a union 
was present and 0 if not. Foreign was coded 1 if foreign institutions 
have share holdings and 0 if not. Because downsizing can directly 
affect turnover rates (Budro 1999), we controlled for the effect of 
Downsizing, which coded 1 for downsizing within three years 
and 0 for all other cases. Prior Performance was also controlled 
because of the influence of prior performance on current outcome. 
In addition, seniority-based pay and pay level were controlled 
because they relate to pay differential decisions and workforce 
performance (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery 2002; Yang and Klaas 2011). 
Seniority was coded 1 if respondents reported that their companies 
use seniority-based pay and 0 if not. We measured Pay Level as 
the average of newcomer pay, first-year manager pay, and first-
year general manager pay weighted by the number of employees at 
each job level. Finally, we also controlled Industry dummies with 
15 dummy variables to capture the 16 industries represented in our 
sample. These industry codes were provided by the classification of 
the HCCP datasets.
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Data analysis
We used hierarchical regression analysis to examine the 
relationship between pay differentials and organizational outcomes. 
We entered the control variables in Step 1, the independent variables 
in Step 2 (Hypotheses 1 and 2), and the two-way interaction terms 
in Step 3 (Hypotheses 3 and 4). The variables were mean centered 




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among 
all variables. Of particular interest are the correlations of financial 
firm performance and turnover rate with pay differentials. ROA, as 
a measures of financial firm performance, was positively correlated 
to pay differentials (r = .08, p <.10). The correlation between the pay 
differentials and turnover rate was also positively related (r = .05), 
yet this relationship was not statistically significant. In addition, 
while organizational identification was negatively associated with 
turnover rates (r = −.08, n.s.), it was positively related to the firm 
performance variable (r = .17, p <.001).
We used hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypotheses. 
The regression results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows 
the hierarchical regression results for the pay differentials and firm 
financial performance. As shown in Table 2, Model 1 explained a sig-
nificant amount of variance (R2 = .180, p < .001). As shown in Model 2, 
the pay differentials had a positive relationship with ROA as a mea-
sure of financial firm performance (b = 6.70, p < .05). Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 1 was supported, as we expected that the pay differential 
should be positively related to the firms’ financial performance. We 
then entered an interaction term between the pay differentials and 
organizational identification. Model 3 of Table 2 reports the results 
of the interaction of pay differentials and organizational identifica-
tion. The results showed that the interaction term – pay differentials 
× organizational identification – was statistically significant (b = 
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-17.71, p < .05). We conducted a series of tests comparing succes-
sive models by using incremental F-tests, as shown at the bottom of 
Table 2. The first test indicates that Model 2, including pay differ-
entials as well as control variables, significantly better than Model 1 
(ΔR2 = .012, p < .05). The second test also shows that Model 3, which 
included the interaction terms of pay differentials and organiza-
tional identification, significantly better than Model 2 (ΔR2 = .022, p 
< .001). This result clearly indicates that the shared organizational 
identification of employees can weaken the positive relationship be-
tween pay differentials and financial firm performance, supporting 
Hypothesis 3. Figure 1 also supported our prediction of pay differen-
tials and financial firm performance.
Table 3 indicates the hierarchical regression results for the pay 
differentials and employee turnover rate. As with earlier steps, the 
first step included the set of control variables (Model 1). The pay dif-
Table 2. Regression results for effects of pay differentials and 
organizational identification on financial performance a






































































Notes:  a N = 400. 15 Industry dummies were included in all equations. 
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
  † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Reexamining the Pay Differentials-Organizational Outcomes Relationship in Korea 57
ferential variable was included in Model 2. As expected, we obtained 
a positive relationship of pay differential with turnover rate, but the 
relationship was not statistically significant (b = .01, n.s.). Thus, Hy-
pothesis 2, stating that pay differentials should increase turnover 
rate, was not supported. As shown in Model 3 of Table 3, we entered 
an interaction term of pay differentials and organizational identifica-
tion. The results showed that the interaction term – pay differentials 
× organizational identification – was statistically significant (b = .16, 
p < .05). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, this finding suggests that 
the shared organizational identification of employees can strengthen 
the positive relationship between pay differentials and turnover rate. 
Incremental F-tests reported no statistically significant difference 
between Models 1 and 2 (ΔR2 = .00, n.s.) and a marginally significant 
difference between Models 2 and 3 (ΔR2 = .013, p < .10).
additional analyses
As shown in Table 3, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. To conduct 
more robust analyses and to identify why the hypothesis was 
















Low Pay Differentials High Pay Differentials 
Notes:  ‘Low pay differentials’ is one standard deviation below the mean. ‘High 
pay differentials’ is one standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 1. Two-way interactive effects of pay differentials and 
organizational identification on financial performance (ROA)
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Organizational identification is about employees’ sense of oneness 
with their organizations. This requires employees to spend some time 
within the organizations so they have first-hand experiences with 
the organization’s strategies, policies, and practices (Abrams, Ando, 
and Hinkle 1998; Ashforth and Mael 1989). Therefore, employee 
tenure is an important factor in developing a sense of organizational 
identification. We divided employee tenure into short-term (less 
than one year) and long-term (more than ten years). As indicated 
in Models 5 and 6 of Table 3, the coefficients of pay differentials 
(b = -.01, n.s.) and the interaction between pay differentials and 
organizational identification (b = .02, n.s.) were not significant for 
employees who worked for less than one year. However, as indicated 
in Models 8 and 9 of Table 3, the coefficients of the independent 
variable (b = .02, p < .001) and the interaction term (b = .11, p < 
.001) were highly significant for employees who have worked for 
more than ten years. Moreover, including the independent variable 
and the interaction term in the model of employees with long-
term tenure explained an additional 6% and 32% of the variance. 
Figure 2 also confirms our prediction of organizational identification 














Low Pay Differentials High Pay Differentials 
Notes:  ‘Low pay differentials’ is one standard deviation below the mean. ‘High 
pay differentials’ is one standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 2. Two-way interactive effects of pay differentials and 
organizational identification on turnover rate (tenure > 10 years)
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These findings show that companies should be cautious about 
adapting and implementing differentiated pay structures from the 
perspective of employee turnover, which serves as another index of 
organizational effectiveness. Although firms do not intend to prompt 
employees to leave, the realized results indicate that employees with 
long-term relationships are likely to lose their sense of loyalty.
COnCLusiOns
Although researchers have conducted numerous studies on 
pay structure, their results have been inconsistent so far (see 
Gerhart and Rynes 2003 for a review). Tournament theory provides 
strong rationales that differentiated pay structures could motivate 
individuals and enhance organizational performance (Eriksson 1999; 
Lazear 1995). However, some empirical studies have demonstrated 
that such pay systems may actually damage firms’ financial 
performance (Bloom 1999; Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen 2008). 
To reconcile these conflicting conclusions, organizational researchers 
have investigated the congruence between pay differentials and 
other factors such as average pay level (e.g., Brown, Sturman, and 
Simmering 2003), work interdependence (e.g., Shaw, Gupta, and 
Delery 2002), pay system communication (e.g., Shaw and Gupta 
2007). Although informative, most existing studies have investigated 
the effectiveness of pay differentials from the perspective of 
organizational practices, overlooking the congruence between the 
pay differential and employee-based factors such as employees’ 
values or expectations regarding their relationships with their 
organizations. This congruence issue is particularly pronounced 
because the realized effects of the pay differential are the byproducts 
of interactions among various organizational contexts (Ferris et al. 
1998). Based on tournament theory and organizational identification 
theory, we explored the relationship between pay differentials 
and organizational outcomes by considering employees’ shared 
perceptions or values: organizational identification.  Results show 
pay differentials with a sample of Korean cross-industry firms 
have a positive influence on only financial performance. Also, as 
predicted, while the positive relationship between pay differentials 
and financial performance became weaker, the relationship 
with turnover became stronger when employees’ organizational 
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identification is high.
These theoretical arguments and empirical results provide 
implications for researchers. First, this study attempts to reconcile 
inconsistent findings of pay structure through theoretical expansion. 
Namely, by integrating tournament theory and organizational 
identification theory, this paper verifies the true effect of pay 
differentials as the byproduct of congruence between the HR 
practice and the employee-side factor. Second, this study calls for 
more attention to employee turnover as a critical organizational 
outcome. Given that the financial aspect is limited in its reflection 
of employees’ perceptions or attitudes (Batt, Colvin, and Keefe 2002; 
Holtom, Mitchell, and Eberly 2008), researchers need to consider 
turnover that indicates the effectiveness of the differentiated pay 
system from an employee perspective. 
This paper also has implications for practitioners. These days a 
large number of firms adopt and implement performance-driven pay 
schemes just following management fads or imitating other firms. 
However, HR practitioners need to be more careful when they design 
and implement hierarchical pay structure because the pay schemes 
can rather destroy current competencies in real organizational 
contexts (Lado and Wilson 1994). As our findings show, when 
employees have strongly shared organizational identification but 
their organization chooses to emphasize wider pay differentials, 
the effect may be detrimental to financial performance and may 
trigger employee turnover. In particular, as our additional analyses 
show, these unintended results are highlighted for employees with 
long-term tenure. These findings indicate that the adoption of a 
individual performance-driven pay system should be considered in 
the light of overall organizational effectiveness. 
As discussed above, this study has several implications, but it 
also has several limitations that suggest some guidelines for future 
research. First, we obtained pay data from overall HR practices in 
Korean firms and, as a result, the creation of testing variables had 
some limitations. For example, the compensation information in the 
HCCP data was limited to pay levels of three positions (first-year 
employees, first-year managers, and first-year general managers). 
Accordingly, we operationalized pay differentials following Siegel 
and Hambrick (2005) because this computation way was the most 
appropriate within our limited data rather than other measurements 
(e.g. the coefficient of variation, the gini coefficient, or the simple pay 
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difference). Second, we call for some caution in the interpretation 
of our findings. As noted earlier, Korean firms compared with 
other empirical settings have unique characteristics and business 
environments that could cause stronger effects that support the 
predictions. Beyond Korea, nevertheless, firms with strong employee 
organizational identification exist throughout the world including 
other Asian–Pacific and Western countries. In particular, many 
companies in Asian–Pacific countries such as China (e.g., Chen, 
Tsui, and Farh 2002; Farh, Hackett, and Liang 2007), Taiwan (e.g., 
Zhu 2003), and Japan (e.g., Benson and Debrous 2003) have also 
experienced severe misfits between individual performance-driven 
pay systems and collective organizational values. In this regard, 
our findings may be valid for many companies in other countries, 
although our empirical data are limited to Korean firms and 
cautious interpretation is needed. 
Based on these limitations, future research might investigate 
organizational outcomes through more combinations of other 
pay systems and other employee-side factors. For example, 
future studies can address interpersonal relationships within an 
organization and embedded structures (Granovetter 2005; Shaw 
et al. 2005). These attempts to bolster the interaction effects of 
compensation systems and organizational contexts will unravel a 
watershed that transforms compensation systems into successfully 
or unsuccessfully realized systems. Also, future research could 
examine how HR systems influenced by contextual factors have 
evolved and developed as the old and the new harmonize and 
sometimes collide (Baron, Burton, and Hanna 1996; Jones, Kalmi, 
and Kauhanen 2010). Not only internal contexts, but external 
factors such as environmental dynamism could be also considered 
in the co-evolution of the pay system and organizational factors 
(Bloom and Michel 2002; Brown, Sturman, and Simmering 2003). In 
addition, future studies could consider how firms might successfully 
implement new HR systems despite the side effects. By combining 
with organizational change, researchers can investigate how firms 
complementarily and synergistically manage clashing HR systems 
and employee-side factors (Martin, Jones, and Callan 2005; 
Rousseau and Tijoriwala 1999).
When a firm chooses exploitation strategy, it is suggested that 
egalitarian pay structures (compressed pay differentials) will be 
more effective because employees leverage existing clients, services, 
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and techniques (Kang, Snell and Swart 2012). However, when a firm 
purses exploration strategy, it is suggested that tall pay structures 
(large pay differentials) will be more effective because employees 
are encouraged to innovate at the risk of failures. Under this kind 
of situation, firms need to provide substantial pay incentives to 
encourage employees to be explorative (Kang, Snell, and Swart 
2012). This could be a very interesting and important research topic 
that needs to be studied in the future. 
Promotion versus prevention focus would be a very interesting 
moderator that needs further attention in the future. Promotion-
focused people prefer to use eagerness-related means, the type of 
means most suited to a concern with advancement, aspiration, and 
accomplishment (Crowe and Higgins 1997). In contrast, prevention-
focused people prefer to use vigilance-related means, the type 
of means most suited to a concern with protection, safety, and 
responsibility. Therefore, top management team (TMT)’s collective 
regulatory orientation such as promotion versus prevention focus is 
expected to moderate the pay differentials–organizational outcomes 
relationship such that this relationship will be stronger when TMT is 
collectively promotion focused rather than prevention focused.
Despite certain limitations, our study contributes to the 
compensation literature by reconciling conflicting theoretical 
arguments and empirical results with respect to the effects of pay 
differentials on organizational outcomes. According to findings 
of this study, considerations of employee-side factors and other 
indexes of organizational outcomes are crucial for resolving the 
contrasting results from previous research on pay differentials. We 
hope that more advanced studies on pay structure will expand our 
initial work in the near future. 
ReFeRenCes
Abrams, D., K. Ando, and S. Hinkle (1998), “Psychological attachment to 
the group: Cross-cultural differences in organizational identification 
and subjective norms as predictors of workers’ turnover intentions,” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(10), 1027-1039.
Andersen, S. M. and S. Chen (2002), “The relational self: An interpersonal 
social-cognitive theory,” Psychological Review, 109, 619-645.
Ashforth, B. E. and F. Mael (1989), “Social identity theory and the 
64 Seoul Journal of Business
organization,” Academy of Management Review, 14, 20-39.
Bae, J. S. (1997), “Beyond seniority-based systems: A paradigm shift in 
Korean HRM?” Asia Pacific Business Review, 3, 82-110.
    and J. T. Lawler (2000), “Organizational and HRM strategies in 
Korea: Impact on firm performance in an emerging economy,” Academy 
of Management Journal, 43(3), 502-517.
    and C. Rowley (2002), “The impact of globalization on HRM: The case 
of South Korea,” Journal of World Business, 36(4): 402-428.
Balkin, D. B. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia (1987), “Toward a contingency theory 
of compensation strategy,” Strategic Management Journal, 8(2), 169-
182.
Baron, J. N., M. D. Burton, and M. T. Hannan (1996), “The road taken: 
Origins and evolution of employment systems in emerging companies,” 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 5(2), 239.
    and D. M. Kreps (1999), Strategic human resources: Frameworks for 
general managers. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Batt, R., A. J. S. Colvin, and J. Keefe (2002), “Employee voice, 
human resource practices, and quit rates: Evidence from the 
telecommunications industry,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
55(4), 573-594.
Becker, B. E. and M. A. Huselid (1992), “The incentive effects of tournament 
compensation systems,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 336-
350.
Benson, J. and P. Debroux (2003), “Flexible labor markets and 
individualized employment: the beginnings of a new Japanese HRM 
system?” Asia Pacific Business Review, 9, 55-75.
Bliese, P. D. (2000), “Within-group agreement, non-independence, and 
reliability: Implications for data aggregation and analysis,” In Multi-level 
Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations, K. J. Klein and S. W. 
Kozlowski eds., Jossey-Bass, 349-381. 
Bloom, M. (1999), “The performance effects of pay dispersion on individuals 
and organizations,” Academy of Management Journal, 42(1), 25-40.
    and J. Michel (2002), “The relationships among organizational 
context, pay dispersion and managerial turnover,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(1), 33-42.
Bowen, D. E. and C. Ostroff (2004), “Understanding HRM-firm performance 
linkages: The role of the “strength” of the HRM system,” Academy of 
Management Review, 29(2), 203-221.
Brown, M. P., M. C. Sturman, and M. J. Simmering (2003), “Compensation 
policy and organizational performance: The efficiency, operational, and 
financial implications of pay levels and pay structure,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 46(6), 752-762.
Budro, A. (1999), “A conceptual framework for analyzing why organizations 
Reexamining the Pay Differentials-Organizational Outcomes Relationship in Korea 65
downsize,” Organization Science, 10(1), 69-82.
Burton, R. M., J. Lauridsen, and B. Obel (2002), “Return on assets loss 
from situational and contingency misfits,” Management Science, 48(11), 
1461-1485.
   , J. Lauridsen, and B. Obel (2004), “The impact of organizational 
climate and strategic fit on firm performance,” Human Resource 
Management, 43(1), 67-82.
    and B. Obel (2004), Strategic organizational diagnosis and design: 
The dynamics of fit. MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Chen, Z. X., A. S. Tsui, and J. L. Farh (2002), “Loyalty to supervisor vs. 
organizational commitment: relationships to employee performance in 
China,” Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 75(3), 
339-356.
Chiang, F. (2005), “A critical examination of Hofstede’s thesis and its 
application to international reward management,” International Journal 
of Human Resource Management, 16(9), 1545-1563.
Cho, T. (2011), “Environmental scanning behavior of the top managers: A 
regulatory focus model,” Seoul Journal of Business, 17 (2), 151-166.
Cross, S., P. Bacon, and M. Morris (2000), “The relational interdependent 
self-construal and relationships,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 78, 791-808.
Crowe, E. and E. T. Higgins (1997), “Regulatory focus and strategic 
inclinations: Promotion and prevention in decision making,” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 69, 117-132.
Ding, D., D. Fields, and S. Akhtar (1997), “An empirical study of human 
resource management policies and practices in foreign-invested 
enterprises in China: the case of Shenzen special economic zone,” 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8(5), 595-613.
Ehrenberg, R. G. and M. L. Bognanno (1990), “Do tournaments have 
incentive effects?” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1307-1324.
Eriksson, T. (1999), “Executive compensation and tournament theory: 
Empirical tests on Danish data,” Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), 
262-280.
Farh, J. L., R. D. Hackett, and J. Liang (2007), “Individual-level cultural 
values as moderators of perceived organizational support-employee 
outcome relationships in China: Comparing the effects of power 
distance and traditionality,” Academy of Management Journal, 50(3), 
715-729.
Ferris, G. R., M. M. Arthur, H. M. Berkson, D. M. Kaplan, G. Harrell-Cook, 
and D. D. Frink (1998), “Toward a social context theory of human 
resource management-organizational effectiveness relationship,” 
Human Resource Management Review, 8(3), 235-264.
66 Seoul Journal of Business
Gerhart, B. and S. L. Rynes (2003), Compensation: Theory, evidence, and 
strategic implications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Glick, W. H. (1985), “Conceptualizing and measuring organizational and 
psychological climate: Pitfalls in multilevel research,” Academy of 
Management Review, 10(3), 601-616.
Granovetter, M. (2005), “The impact of social structure on economic 
outcomes,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 33-50.
Grund, C. and N. Westergaard-Nielsen (2008), “The dispersion of employees’ 
wage increases and firm performance,” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 61(4), 485-501.
Hekman, D. R., G. A. Bigley, H. K. Steensma, and J. F. Hereford (2009), 
“Combined effects of organizational and professional identification 
on the reciprocity dynamics for professional employees,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 52(3), 506-526.
Henderson, A. D. and J. W. Fredrickson (2001), “Top management team 
coordination needs and the CEO pay gap: A competitive test of 
economic and behavioral views,” Academy of Management Journal, 
44(1), 96-117.
Hofmann, D. A. (1997), “An overview of the logic and rationale of 
hierarchical linear models,” Journal of Management, 23(6): 723-744.
Hogg, M. A. (1992), The social psychology of group cohesiveness: From 
attraction to social identity. NY: New York University Press.
    and D. J. Terry (2000), “Social identity and self-categorization 
processes in organizational contexts,” Academy of Management Review, 
25(1), 121-140.
Holtom, B. C., T. R. Mitchell, and M. B. Eberly (2008), “Turnover and 
retention research: A glance at the past, a closer review of the present, 
and a venture into the future,” Academy of Management Annals, 2(1), 
231-274.
James, L. R., R. G. Demaree, and G. Wolf (1984), “Estimating within-group 
interrater reliability with and without response bias,” Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 69(1), 85-98.
James, L. R., R. G. Demaree, and G. Wolf (1992), “rwg: An assessment of 
interrater agreement,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(2), 306-309.
Jenkins, G. D., A. Mitra, N. Gupta, and J. D. Shaw (1998), “Are financial 
incentives related to performance? A meta-analytic review of empirical 
research,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(5), 777-787.
Jones, D. C., P. Kalmi, and A. Kauhanen (2010), “Teams, incentive pay, and 
productive efficiency: Evidence from A food-processing plant,” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 63(4), 606-719.
Kang, S.-C., S. Scott, A. Swart (2012), “Options-based HRM, intellectual 
capital, and exploratory and exploitative learning in law firms’ practice 
Reexamining the Pay Differentials-Organizational Outcomes Relationship in Korea 67
groups,” Human Resource Management, 51(4), 461-485.
Kaufman, B. E. (2002), “Models of union wage determination: What have we 
learned since Dunlop and Ross?” Industrial Relations, 41(1), 110-158.
Kepes, S., J. Delery, and N. Gupta (2009), “Contingencies in the effects of 
pay range on organizational effectiveness,” Personnel Psychology, 62, 
497-531.
Kerr, J. and J. W. Slocum (1987), “Managing corporate culture through 
reward systems,” Academy of Management Executive, 1(2), 99-106.
Kerr, S. (1975), “On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B,” Academy 
of Management Journal, 18(4), 769-783.
Kim, S. (2010), The change of performance-driven HRM system in Korean 
firms. Seoul: Seoul National Univ. Press.
Ko, H. C. and K. T. Chung (2008), “The evolution direction of performance-
driven HRM system,” CEO Information, Samsung Economic Research 
Institute.
Kozlowki, S. W. J. and K. J. Klein (2000), Multilevel theory, research, and 
methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Lado, A. A. and M. C. Wilson (1994), “Human resource systems and 
sustained competitive advantage: A competency-based perspective,” 
Academy of Management Review, 19(4), 699-727.
Lambert, R. A., D. F. Larcker, and K. Weigelt (1993), “The structure of 
organizational incentives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(3), 438-
461.
Lazear, E. P. (1995), Personnel Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
    (1999), Personnel economics: Past lessons and future directions. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
    and S. Rosen (1981), Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor 
contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lepak, D. P. and S. A. Snell (2002), “Examining the human resource 
architecture: The relationships among human capital, employment, 
and human resource configurations,” Journal of Management, 28(4), 
517-543.
Li, X., S. J. Frenkel, and K. Sanders (2011), “Strategic HRM as process: 
How HR system and organizational climate strength influence 
Chinese employee attitudes,” International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 22(9), 1825-1842.
Lu, Y. and I. Bjorkman (1997), “HRM practices in China-Western joint 
ventures: MNC standardization versus localization,” International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 8(5), 614-628.
Mael, F. A. and B. E. Ashforth (1992), “Alumni and their alma mater: A 
partial test of the reformulated model of organizational identification,” 
68 Seoul Journal of Business
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 13(2), 103-123.
    and B. E. Ashforth (1995), “Loyal from day one: Biodata, 
organizational identification and turnover among newcomers,” 
Personnel Psychology, 48, 307-333.
    and L. E. Tetrick (1992), “Identifying organizational identification,” 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 52, 813-824.
Main, B. G. M., C. A. O’Reilly Ⅲ, and J. Wade (1993), “Top executive pay: 
Tournament or teamwork?” Journal of Labor Economics, 11, 606-628.
Martin, A. J., E. S. Jones, and V. J. Callan (2005), “The role of psychological 
climate in facilitating employee adjustment during organizational 
change,” European Journal of Work and Organizational, 14(3), 263-289.
McClelland, P. L. (2008), Top Management Group Pay Disparities and 
Subsequent Firm Performance: The Effect of Powerful CEOs. An Arbor, 
MI: ProQuest.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992), Economics, Organization, and 
Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Morrison, E. W. and S. L. Robinson (1997), “When employees feel betrayed: 
A model of how psychological contract violation develops,” Academy of 
Management Review, 22(1), 226-256.
Mossholder, K. W., R. P. Settoon, and S. C. Henagan (2005), “A relational 
perspective on turnover: Examining structural, attitudinal, and 
behavioral predictors,” Academy of Management Journal, 48(4), 607-
618.
Ouchi, W. G. (1979), “A conceptual framework for the design of 
organizational control mechanisms,” Management Science, 25(9), 833-
848.
    (1980), “Markets, bureaucracies, and clans,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 25(1), 129-141.
Pfeffer, J. and A. Davis-Blake (1992), “Salary dispersion, location in the salary 
distribution, and turnover among college administrators,” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 45(4), 753-763. 
Rosen, S. (1986), “Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments,” 
American Economic Review, 76, 701-715.
Rousseau, D. M. (1985), “Issues of Level in Organizational Research,” 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, 1-37.
    (1989), “Psychological and implied contracts in organizations,” 
Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2(2), 121-139.
    (1995), Psychological contracts in organizations: Understanding 
written and unwritten agreements. Newburry Park, CA: Sage.
    and S. A. Tijoriwala (1999), “What’s a good reason to change? 
Motivated reasoning and social accounts in promoting organizational 
change,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(4), 514-528.
Reexamining the Pay Differentials-Organizational Outcomes Relationship in Korea 69
Rowley, C. and J. S. Bae (2002), “Globalization and transformation of 
human resource management in South Korea,” International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 13(3), 522-549.
   , J. Benson, and M. Warner (2004), “Towards an Asian model of 
human resource management? A comparative analysis of China, 
Japan, and South Korea,” International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 15(5), 917-933.
Schwab, D. P. (1991), “Contextual variables in employee performance-
turnover relationships,” Academy of Management Journal, 34(4), 966-
975.
Siegel, P. A. and D. C. Hambrick (2005), “Pay disparities within Top 
management groups: evidence of harmful effects on performance of 
high-technology firms,” Organization Science, 16(3), 259-274.
Shaw, J. D., B. R. Dineen, R. Fang, and R. F. Vellella (2009), “Employee-
organization exchange relationships, HRM practices, and quit rates of 
good and poor performers,” Academy of Management Journal, 52(5), 
1016-1033.
   , M. K. Duffy, J. L. Johnson, and D. E. Lockhart (2005), “Turnover, 
social capital losses, and performance,” Academy of Management 
Journal, 48(4), 594-606.
     and N. Gupta (2007), “Pay system characteristics and quit patterns 
of good, average, and poor performers,” Personnel Psychology, 60(4), 
903-928.
   , N. Gupta, and J. E. Delery (2002), “Pay dispersion and workforce 
performance: Moderating effects of incentives and interdependence,” 
Strategic Management Journal, 23(6), 491-512.
Sohn, E., S. Chang, S., and J. Song (2009), “Technological catching-up and 
latecomer strategy: A case study of the Asian shipbuilding industry,” 
Seoul Journal of Business, 15 (2), 25-57.
Stajkovic, A. D. and F. Luthans (2001), “Differential effects of incentive 
motivators on work performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 
44, 580-590.
Tajfel, H. and J. C. Turner (1979), “An integrative theory of intergroup 
conflict,”  In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, W. G. Austin 
and S. Worchel eds., Brooks/Cole, 33-47.
Yang, H. and B. S. Klaas (2011), “Pay dispersion and the financial 
performance of the firm: Evidence from Korea,” International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 22(1), 2147-2166.
Zhu, Y. (2003), “The post-Asian financial crisis: changes in HRM in 
Taiwanese enterprises,” Asia Pacific Business Review, 9, 147-164.
70 Seoul Journal of Business
Received January 18, 2013
Revision Received March 12, 2013
Accepted March 18, 2013
